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Abstract 
A framework is presented for a computational theory of probabilistic 
argument. The Probabilistic Reasoning Environment encodes knowledge 
at three levels. At the deepest level are a set of schemata encoding the 
system's domain knowledge. This knowledge is used to build a set of 
second-level arguments, which are structured for efficient recapture of the 
knowledge used to construct them. Finally, at the top level is a Bayesian 
network constructed from the arguments. The system is designed to 
facilitate not just propagation of beliefs and assimilation of evidence, but 
also the dynamic process of constructing a belief network, evaluating its 
adequacy, and revising it when necessary. 
1 Introduction 
Attempts over the past thirty years at automating 
intelligence have altered our view of what it means 
to be intelligent. Computers can now beat all but 
the very best human chess players, but we remain 
very far from automating the kind of everyday 
reasoning that requires no special intellectual ability. 
We are discovering just how impressive ordinary 
intelligence is. 
Ordinary intelligence means the ability to attack an 
ill-formulated problem, building a problem 
formulation as we try to solve the problem. It 
means being able to act in a world that is only 
partially understood. It means allocating our effort 
between solving the problem using the model we 
have and improving our model. It means dealing 
with uncertainty not just about which outcomes will 
occur within a given problem structure but also 
about what the problem structure is. 
Dealing with uncertainty is at the heart of intelligent 
reasoning. We need to be able to plan and take 
actions that depend on outcomes we can predict 
only imperfectly. We make these predictions using 
a model of the world that we know is inadequate. 
We use inaccurate models for computational 
reasons, or because they are all we have. Frequently 
the world surprises us by failing to conform to our 
expectations. When this happens, we try to 
diagnose the cause of our failure to predict. Was 
the failure drastic enough to require changing our 
model, or can the problem be swept under the rug 
(until too many "insignificant" failures accumulate)? 
How shall we change the model? Is minor tweaking 
sufficient, or is wholesale revision needed? can we 
think of a plausible alternative model, or do we 
remain in confusion? 
Our current world model drives this revision 
process. We are more likely to ignore failures when 
there is no alternate model to explain them. 
Sometimes we cling rigidly and stubbornly to a 
clearly inadequate model, refusing to acknowledge 
its failures of prediction. If we remain too narrowly 
focused within our old model, we will not be able 
to understand the explanatory power of candidate 
new theories. Being open to change, acknowledging 
that our world model may be inadequate, makes us 
more willing to search for alternate models when we 
encounter disconfirming evidence. But of course 
there will always be disconfirming evidence, because 
our model is never quite right. If we are too willing 
to change models, we will be unable to act. All our 
energy will be spent searching for the right model 
and none on acting with the model at hand. 
How does a reasoner know when a violation of 
expectations is significant? An intelligent reasoner 
needs at least a rough indicator of the strength of 
conclusions, or of the degree of surprise when an 
expectation is contradicted by the evidence. Simple 
belief strength indicators are not enough--they need 
to be propagated across chains of inference and 
combined across multiple arguments to the same 
conclusion. 
.;.· 
Probability theory is the strongest available 
candidate for a representation language for belief 
strengths (Pearl, 1988). When we say a proposition 
is true with probability p, the complement 1-p 
represents a single summary measure of the 
conditions under which the proposition does not 
hold. Similarly, if we state a rule in the form, 
wGiven a, b holds with probability p,w the 
complement 1-p summarizes the unmentioned 
exceptions to the general rule allowing us to 
conclude b from a. 
Until very recently, applications of probability theory 
have focused on updating beliefs in pre-compiled 
knowledge bases. Even applications of probability 
in artificial intelligence have focused mainly on the 
computational aspects of belief propagation (as well 
as on philosophical justifications for using 
probabilities at all). The argument building and 
revision process has received comparatively little 
attention. 
This situation is changing, however. Adams (1966, 
1975) has developed a probabilistic semantics for 
non-monotonic reasoning. Pearl (1988) discusses 
some of the issues that will need to be addressed if 
probability is to move beyond pre-structured 
problems. Cohen (1986) and Laskey, Cohen and 
Martin (1989), precursors to the present paper, 
discuss model building and revision in the context 
of a Dempster-Sbafer belief propagation framework. 
Wellman and Heckerman (1987) present a 
philosophy about the role of numerical belief calculi 
that is compatible with the view taken here. 
The purpose of this paper is to present an initial 
framework for a computational theory of 
probabilistic argumenL The basic building blocks 
of a Probabilistic Reasoning Environment (PRE) 
are identified. A preliminary discussion is offered 
of bow the pieces would be implemented and how 
they would tie together. PRE does not just 
assimilate evidence and compute probabilities. 
The primary focus is is on a much broader set of 
issues, including: the knowledge representations 
and reasoning strategies needed to construct a 
probabilistic model, to evaluate the adequacy of that 
model, and to revise the model when necessary. 
While not intended to be a faithful cognitive model, 
the PRE framework has its basis in theories of how 
humans cope with limited computational resources. 
It is compatible with a cognitive-based theory of 
probability assessment developed by Smith, Benson 
and Curley (forthcoming). It is intended to be 
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capable of implementation. Ultimately, the theory 
will provide both a framework for computerized 
reasoning under uncertainty and heuristic 
prescriptions for human reasoning. 
2 Background 
Probability is a language for expressing degrees of 
belief intermediate between truth and falsehood. 
In a probabilistic knowledge base, the strength of 
an argument from a to b is represented by the 
conditional probability of b given a, denoted by 
P(b Ia). The degree to which this probability falls 
short of certainty summarizes the strength of 
unmentioned exceptions to the general rule that b 
holds when a does (Pearl, 1988). The probability 
calculus is a coherent, logically sound way of 
chaining and combining probabilistic rule and belief 
strengths. 
The main difficulty with the theory--the context­
dependent nature of probabilities--is in fact the 
source of its strength. Suppose we assert that 
Tweety flies with probability .9, based on the 
evidence that Tweety is a bird. It is entirely 
consistent with the theory to change this degree of 
belief to .05, or even 0, when we learn that Tweety 
is a turkey. P(b Ia) need bear no relation at all to 
P(bla,c). 
Probabilities are inherently non-monotonic--in fact, 
too much so. Any time we add a new fact to our 
knowledge base, all our probability assignments are 
potentially up for grabs. A fully specified 
probability model for a universe of n propositions 
requires assigning Z!' probability numbers--a 
probability for each combination of truth values for 
each of the propositions. This bleak picture has fed 
a belief in the impracticality of probabilities as a 
computational framework for uncertain reasoning. 
Several important tools are available that allow us 
to bring probabilistic reasoning into the realm of 
practicality. The primary tool is one statis�i�ns 
have been applying for years: condiUonal 
independence. When we make an independence 
assumption, we judge that the truth value of one 
probability is irrelevant to the probability of 
another. Thus, we may judge that learning that 
Tweety is brown does not change our belief in 
:whether she can fly: 
P(/lies I bird,turkey ,brown) = P(/lies I bird,IUrkey). 
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A second tool, and a more recent innovation, is the 
network representation for the dependency structure 
of a probabilistic model. In a Markov network, a 
proposition is •shielded" by its neighbors from the 
influence of the rest of the knowledge base. 
Conditional on these neighbors, the proposition's 
probability is independent of the truth values of the 
other propositions. 
Finally, Pearl (1988) points to causation as a 
powerful tool for structuring probabilistic 
dependency relationships. If a causes b, then the 
probability of b depends on whether a is true. If 
a and care common causes-of an effect b, they may 
be a priori independent but become dependent when 
their common effect is observed. For example, it 
seems reasonable to judge that whether my maid is 
honest is independent of whether my children have 
been playing in my room. But when I observe that 
my favorite gold necklace is missing, they become 
dependent: if I learn that the children were in my 
room, my suspicion of the maid is alleviated. This 
kind of behavior is an important feature of ordinary 
non-monotonic reasoning--an argument from effect 
to cause is weakened when we learn of an alternate 
cause for the effect (Pearl, 1988). 
The Bayesian network is becoming the dominant 
representation for probabilistic reasoning systems 
(Pearl, 1988). A Bayesian network consists of 
nodes, which represent propositions, and directed 
arcs, which represent probabilistic dependencies. (In 
general, nodes represent exclusive and exhaustive 
sets of propositions; for simplicity, attention is 
limited here to binary, or true/false propositions.) 
With each node is associated a set of numbers 
corresponding to the probability of the node 
conditional on each combination of truth values of 
its parents. Conditional on its parents, a node is 
independent of all indirect predecessors in the 
graph. 
The convention is that arcs proceed from cause to 
effect (Figure 1 ). The probability of effect given 
cause is a measure of the strength of a ·causal 
connection. The pattern of conditional dependence 
in the network reflects the causal structure of the 
domain. Pearl (1988) speculates that humans are 
driven to develop causal structures precisely because 
these causal structures reduce the computational 
burden of correct context-dependent reasoning. 
The Bayesian network representation has provided 
a computationally feasible model for adjusting 
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Figure 1: Bayesian Network for Necklace Problem 
beliefs in a knowledge base when new facts are 
observed. But until now, the greatest attention has 
been focused on efficient computation when all the 
propositions that might be observed and their 
probabilistic relationships are given a priori. Like 
the early expen systems, current probabilistic 
systems are limited to constrained, repetitive 
problems, in which the form (if not the content) of 
the incoming data is anticipated ahead of time. 
Now that computational tools are available to 
reason with a pre-set network, it is time to tum to 
the task of building, maintaining and revising a 
belief network dynamically. For this, a more highly 
structured representation for a probabilistic 
argument will be required. 
3 A Probabilistic Argument Structure 
The Probabilistic Reasoning Environment (PRE) 
needs to be able to construct probabilistic arguments 
dynamically, evaluate whether the current structure 
is adequate, and revise arguments as necessary. 
Argument construction involves a local expansion of 
the knowledge base, activating knowledge relevant 
to the argument The results of this local problem­
solving activity are summarized in an argument 
structure, which is exponed to become pan of the 
belief network being constructed. In the interest of 
parsimony, the details of this local expansion are not 
retained. But in the interest of efficient model 
maintenance, the argument structure should be 
designed for efficient recapture of the knowledge 
that went into constructing the argument 
The PRE argument structure is based on Toulmin's 
model of an argument (I'oulmin, et al., 1984). A 
probabilistic argument is represented by a frame 
which has six slots. Three of these are common to 
any of a number of numerical belief propagation 
approaches: grounds (antecedent), cklim 
(consequent), and modal qualifier (argument 
strength). 
The remaining slots contain knowledge useful for 
dynamic network maintenance. According to 
Toulmin, the WtuTant slot provides justification for 
the link between grounds and claim, and the backing 
provides tunher justification for the warranL In 
PRE, the warrant slot is a pointer to the knowledge 
structure that was activated to construct the 
argument. The (optional) backing is a pointer to a 
causal model that explains the causal mechanism 
underlying the inference. The final slot contains 
possible rebuttals. As we noted above, probabilities 
are an efficient mechanism for summarizing 
exceptions to a rule. We summarize these 
exceptions with a single number because it is not 
wonh the computational effon to include them in 
the model. But the judgment of which exceptions 
to include and which to summarize by probabilities 
may need to be revised as new facts come in. The 
rebuttal slot allows certain salient exceptions to be 
listed explicitly; when observed, these exceptions 
trigger model revision. 
The idea is to build a Bayesian network from PRE 
argument structures. It would seem natural, then, 
that grounds should correspond to parent nodes, 
claim to consequent nodes, and modal qualifiers to 
the conditional probability of claim conditional on 
grounds. Some difficulties with this scheme arise 
from the interaction of all the propositions in the 
network. A probability model requires that there 
must be an ordering of all the nodes consistent with 
the directionality of the arcs--that is, there must be 
no directed cycles in the network. Pearl (1988) 
argues that an intuitively appealing way to achieve 
such consistency is to require an ordering by 
causality. An ordering by causality generally exhibits 
greater conditional independence than other 
orderings (Figure 2). Indeed, Pearl argues that what 
we call causes may correspond to knowledge 
structures we create because of the attractive 
computational features of the conditional 
independence they induce. Yet we often argue from 
effect to cause as well as from cause to effect. If 
PRE argument structures are to correspond in an 
intuitive way to arguments we expon as abstractions 
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Figure %: Arc Re.ersal Introduces 
Non-Independency In Network 
from more detailed internal reasoning, then we must 
allow argument in either direction. 
We adopt the convention that grounds and claim 
may correspond to either cause or effect, so that 
argument can be in the direction that is most 
natural given the contexL But we require that the 
nodes in the Bayesian network constructed from the 
collection of arguments be ordered causally. 
Therefore, the propositions listed as grounds and 
claim must be tagged with indicators of causal 
dependency. Specifically, a subset of the 
propositions is distinguished as causes, and the 
remainder are tagged as effects of the cause 
propositions. 
The topological structure of the Bayesian network 
is determined by the grounds and claim slots of the 
constituent arguments, together with the causal 
structuring information. The modal qualifier slot 
contains the probability information. The causal 
Bayesian network representation requires the 
probability of each combination of truth values of 
the effect variables, conditional on each combination 
of truth values of the cause variables. If there are 
m causes and k effects, this amounts to '1!"+/c 
numbers. Often the relationship between cause and 
effect can be modeled by a structure with fewer 
parameters, such as the •noisy or• (Pearl, 1988). 
4 Constructing Arguments 
People's knowledge appears to be organized in 
complex, structured systems of pointers. These 
structures distill and organize memories of past 
experiences, indexing them so that they are retrieved 
in contexts in which they are likely to be useful. 
Expertise appears to constitute not more knowledge 
per se, but more efficient organization and retrieval 
strategies. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Schemas such as scripts and frames were developed 
as an attempt to model human-like organizational 
strategies on the computer. PRE uses schema-based 
reasoning to construct probabilistic arguments, which 
are used to build a Bayesian network. 
Arguments may be constructed by searching for 
consequences of given grounds (forward chaining), 
by searching backwards for antecedents of a given 
claim (backward chaining), or by a mixture of these 
modes. An attempt to build an argument results in 
activation of a schema related to the grounds in the 
case of forward chaining or �he claim in the case of 
backward chaining. This schema may activate other 
knowledge structures, as problem solving occurs at 
a finer level of abstraction than represented by the 
target Bayesian network. This problem solving 
activity is summarized by a single PRE argument 
structure, which is exponed and added to the 
emerging Bayesian network. 
What features must be represented by the schemas 
used to build PRE argument structures? First, the 
schema needs to represent or contain pointers to 
knowledge about the causal dynamics of the 
phenomenon it represents. Second, schema 
activation and inference must not just be qualitative, 
as in traditional AI systems, but must have 
associated numerical strengths which can be used to 
construct the conditional probabilities for the PRE 
modal qualifier sloL Third, the system must use 
these activation strengths to construct conditional 
probabilities for the Bayesian network. 
Our minds are organized for efficient categorization 
and summarization of similar experiences. Over 
repeated experience, similar instances blur into an 
expectation of a •prototypical• experience, with a 
strength that reflects the frequency of occurrence of 
an experience similar to the prototype. Pearl (1988) 
suggests that probability is intuitive as a model for 
belief strength precisely because our minds use 
belief strengths to summarize repeated similar 
experiences, which we observe as frequencies. To 
build PRE, we need to design models for schema 
activation strength that can be related to 
probabilities. When a cause activates a schema 
which infers the effect, it seems reasonable to say 
that the activation strength is (perhaps a monotone 
transformation of) P(effectlcause). Heckerman 
(1986) suggests that evidential rule strengths are 
best represented as likelihood ratios. Thus, when 
an effect activates a schema to infer cause, the 
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activation strength is assumed to be a function of 
the likelihood ratio 
LR = P(effectjcause) 
P(effect l-cause) 
The grounds, claim and qualifier slots are all that 
are needed to build the Bayesian network. The 
purpose of the warrant, backing and rebuttal slots 
is to facilitate monitoring the model and revising 
beliefs when necessary. 
Recall that all probability assessments are relative 
to a context. PRE's probability assessments depend 
on the knowledge active at the time the assessments 
are made. When the assumptions underlying the 
assessments do not hold, the probability assessments 
no longer apply and the model needs to be reviseed. 
Four different levels of exception can be identified: 
• Explicit exceptions: these are listed in the rebuttal 
slot. 
• Implicit exceptions: these are enumerated explicitly 
during argument construction and can be 
regenerated easily, but are not exponed as 
rebuttals. 
• Background exceptions: these are not enumerated 
explicitly, but could become available with funher 
search. 
• Embedded exceptions: these are exceptions that 
are not represented even implicitly in the system's 
knowledge base (at least not currently). 
In general, explicit exceptions are represented as 
rebuttals, implicit exceptions are available by 
reactivating the schema pointed to by the warrant, 
and background exceptions require activating the 
backing. 
Having several tiers of exceptions allows the system 
to achieve greater efficiency without sacrificing too 
much flexibility. Explicit exceptions are more 
salient-they will be discovered immediately if they 
occur. But representing all exceptions explicitly 
would be prohibitively costly. Implicit and 
background exceptions take problem solving to 
discover, and sometimes they will be missed because 
the system did not direct its attention to searching 
for them. This happens in human reasoning as well, 
and is one of the prices we pay for computational 
efficiency. 
S Monitorin1 and Model Revision 
With qualitative non-monotonic reasoning, we know 
when assumptions need to be revised. When a 
contradiction is derived, there must be a flaw in one 
or another line of reasoning. One of the system's 
assumptions must therefore be changed. Although 
there are no generally accepted, theoretically 
grounded criteria for deciding which assumptions to 
change, there is no doubt that the model needs 
revising. 
In a probabilistic system, we may never encounter 
an out-and-out contradiction. We may observe 
some improbable combinations of evidence, but the 
nature of probability leads us to expect improbable 
events occasionally. How do we distinguish a 
problem with the model from the luck of the draw? 
We almost never believe our probability model 
represents the truth--instead, we view it as an 
approximation to a more complex reality. 
Probabilities are used to summarize relevant factors 
not explicitly mentioned in the model. Whenever 
something unexpected happens, it means some 
relevant factor, initially judged improbable enough 
that it was not made explicit in the model, has 
happened. We must now ask, after the fact, 
whether it is feasible and wonh the effon to revise 
the model to include it explicitly. 
Laskey, Cohen and Manin (1989) suggest, for 
Dempster-Shafer models, using the normalization 
factor from Dempster's Rule as a measure of model 
adequacy. One minus the normalization factor is 
the belief assigned to the empty set before 
normalization, and is thus a measure of the degree 
of conflict. When this number gets too high, they 
suggest, the model needs revising. 
Bayesian models can be viewed as Dempster-Shafer 
models in which all mass is assigned to singletons; 
under this view, the normalization factor 
corresponds to the probability, prior to observing 
the data, that these particular data would be 
observed. Thus, high conflict means we observed 
data that were initially viewed as improbable. 
But how improbable is improbable enough? Laskey, 
Cohen and Manin do not say how high conflict 
needs to be before it is considered too high. When 
there is a great deal of data, the specific data that 
occur will always be improbable (e.g., the most likely 
outcome of ten tosses of a weighted coin that lands 
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heads with .9 probability is all heads, but this 
outcome has probability only .35). 
It makes more sense to consider not the absolute 
likelihood of the data, but rather the likelihood 
relative to some other hypothesis. When there is 
a well-defined alternative model, we can construct 
the likelihood ratio: 
LR = P(data lmodell) 
P(data lmode/2) 
This likelihood ratio plays an important role in the 
theory of statistical hypothesis testing, as a measure 
of whether modell is adequate or needs to be 
replaced by mode/2. 
Once we have decided to initiate model revision, 
and once we have developed one or more candidate 
revisions, the likelihood ratio may prove useful as 
a way of evaluating whether to adopt any of the 
candidates. But we also need some heuristic 
measure of conflict to tell us when to initiate the 
process of searching for a better model. For this I 
suggest comparing the likelihood of the data not 
against a specific alternate model (which we do not 
yet have), but against our prior expectation of how 
likely the data would be: 
= P(data lmodell) 
E(P(data lmodell)] 
(In a slight abuse of notation, the term data in the 
numerator refers to the acutal observed data; the 
expectation in the denominator refers to the prior 
expectation over all possible realizations of the 
data.) When conflict occurs, it is a signal that some 
exception summarized by the probabilities in the 
model occurred. High conflict is a signal that the 
system needs to evaluate its model, attempt to 
construct one or more plausible alternative models, 
and decide whether to retain the old model or adopt 
a revision. 
To do this, the system needs to know which 
arguments are responsible for the conflict. 
Arguments are suspect if changing their belief 
strength would greatly decrease conflict. They are 
suspect if in the current context a rebuttal has 
become probable. They are suspect if currently 
active knowledge would invalidate the warrant or 
the backing. 
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The system needs to use heuristics to prioritize its 
search for exceptions. Potential heuristics include 
the following: search for exceptions that are a 
priori probable; search for exceptions that, if true, 
would change the target probability the most; search 
for exceptions for which the information search 
process costs the least. 
6 Example: 1be Missinl Necklace 
Imagine that PRE is embedded in a humaniform 
robot (named Prescilla), who discovers one morning 
that her favorite necklace . is missing. A causal 
schema is activated that encodes her knowledge 
about missing things. Two explanations are 
activated: that the necklace was misplaced or that 
someone took it. Because Prescilla rarely misplaces 
things, the first explanation is not elaborated. 
Prescilla begins searching her memory for candidate 
necklace-grabbers: that is, people who were in the 
room and had a motive to take the necklace. She 
recalls that the maid cleaned the house yesterday. 
Prescilla activates a schema about maids stealing 
things. She constructs the following argument 
structure: 
Grounds: 
Claim: 
Warrant: 
Backing: 
Rebuttals: 
Qualifiers: 
Necklace is missing [effect] 
Maid took necklace [cause] 
- <Maid-steal schema> 
- <Things-missing schema>; 
<Theft-schema> 
Someone else took it; 
Prescilla misplaced it 
.75 = P(missingjmaid took it) 
P(missingj-maid took it) 
The symbol - indicates a pointer to a knowledge 
structure. <Maid-steal schema> is the schema 
mentioned above that encodes knowledge about 
maids stealing things. The likelihood ratio in the 
qualifier slot is a function of its activation strength. 
<Things-missing schema> is the schema that was 
activated as soon as the missing necklace was 
discovered. <Maid-steal schema> is an instance of 
a general schema on theft, <theft-schema>; this 
schema is pointed to by the backing slot because its 
instance was activated as the warrant. Although 
Prescilla did not create an argument for misplacing 
the necklace, she acknowledges the possibility as a 
rebuttal. Another rebuttal reflects the possibility 
that there may have been another culprit. 
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From this argument structure, Prescilla builds a 
Bayesian network with two nodes and an arc from 
maid took necklace to necklace missing (a piece of 
the network in Figure 1). To compute the posterior 
probability that the maid took the necklace given 
that it is missing, Prescilla also needs a prior 
probability P(maid took necklace). She extends the 
network by constructing an arc from maid is 
dishonest to maid took necklace in a similar manner 
to that described above. She then directly assesseses 
a prior probability for maid dishonest. The right­
hand side of the network in Figure 1 is now in 
place; the left-hand side has not been expanded. 
A brief description follows of how conflicting 
evidence could lead Prescilla to build the left-hand 
side of the network in Figure 1. Imagine that 
Prescilla tells her co-worker, who happens to use 
the same maid, that she thinks the maid stole the 
necklace. The co-worker says that she has known 
the maid for years, and that she is honest. Prescilla 
now has a new, conflicting argument; the grounds 
slot contains the co-worker's testimony, and the 
claim is -maid dishonest. The associated Bayesian 
network arc goes from -maid dishonest to co-worker 
says maid is honest (this arc does not appear in 
Figure 1 ). Prescilla notes that conflict is high, and 
decides that she needs to revise her model. 
Still sure of her superior organizational skills, 
Prescilla decides to consider only the first rebuttal. 
She searches for evidence of other possible necklace­
grabbers, and remembers that the children were 
playing in the room yesterday. Now she constructs 
the left-band side of the network in Figure 1. 
7 Discussion 
If probability is to become a useful tool for artificial 
intelligence, it must be capable of application to 
messy problems. There is a need for probabilistic 
reasoning in environments in which the problem 
space, goals, success criteria and relevant 
information are poorly specified. Perhaps the most 
important challenge facing anificial intelligence in 
general is the development of computer 
architectures capable of coping with ill-structured 
problems. Mainstream AI has been tackling messy 
problems, with some degree of success. Until now, 
probability research has focused almost exclusively 
on well-structured problems. 
This paper has presented a preliminary framework 
for a Probabilistic Reasoning Environment (PRE). 
The focus bas been on the knowledge structures 
necessary to support dynamic construction of 
arguments and revision of the model when events 
show it to be inadequate. A PRE argument is 
represented by a frame, with slots suggested by an 
argument structure proposed by Toulmin. PRE 
constructs these argument structures and uses them 
to construct a Bayesian network. As information is 
assimilated by the network, the adequacy of the 
current model is monitored. A dynamic argument 
revision process is initiated when conflict reacheS 
unacceptable levels. 
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